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DISCOVERY OF EXPERT INFORMATION UNDER THE FEDERAL
RULES
With the adoption of extensive pre-trial discovery mechanisms, prepara-
tion for trial in the federal system underwent a dramatic alteration. In-
stead of relying upon pleadings to perform the tasks of notice-giving, issue
formulation, and fact-revelation, the various discovery devices available
under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure allow the parties "to obtain the
fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before trial."' Discovery
was created to promote the just, speedy, and inexpensive disposal of litiga-
tion. To this end, discovery serves to (1) facilitate the formulation and
narrowing of issues; (2) protect against unfair surprise during trial; (3)
detect any superflous claims and defenses; and (4) encourage and aid
attempts to reach a pre-trial settlement.2 Pre-trial discovery was designed
to eliminate the "sporting" theory of litigation and to provide instead for
a resolution of litigation upon the merits.
Concurrent with the growth of liberal discovery practices has been an
increasing use of and reliance upon expert information in the investigation,
preparation, disposition and trial of cases.4 Although prior to 1970 the
1. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 501 (1947). The Court further stated:
We agree, of course, that the deposition-discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and
liberal treatment. No longer can the time-honored cry of "fishing expedition" serve to
preclude a party from inquiring into the facts underlying his opponent's case. Mutual
knowledge of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
litigation. To that end, either party may compel the other to disgorge whatever facts
he has in his possession. The deposition-discovery procedure simply advances the stage
at which the disclosure can be compelled from the time of trial to the period preceding
it, thus reducing the possibility of surprise. Id. at 507.
2. F. JAMES, CIVIL PROCEDURE § 6.2 (1965); Kalinowski, Use of Discovery Against the Expert
Witness, 40 F.R.D. 43, 45 (1966) [hereinafter cited as Kalinowski]; Long, Discovery and
Experts Under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 38 F.R.D. 111, 112-13 (1965) [hereinafter
cited ao Long]; Note, Developments in the Law - Discovery, 74 HARV. L. REV. 940, 944-46
(1961).
3. 8 C. WRIGHT & A. MILLER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 2001 (1970) [hereinafter
cited as 8 WRIGHT & MILLER].
4. Emroch, Examination of the Adversary's Expert, 1961 PERSONAL INJURY ANNUAL 727,
740-41. In discussing the importance of expert information in products liability litigation,
Emroch quotes 1 L. FRUMER & M. FRIEDMAN, PRODUCTS LIABILITY § 12.02 [11 (1960 ed.):
[Tihis is the age of the expert. Expert testimony has been and will continue to be
tremendously important and, in some cases, indispensable, in products liability cases,
in connection with such matters as proof or disproof of causation in fact, showing
applicability or inapplicability of res ipsa loquitur, and proof or disproof of various
other issues in respect to negligence. In fact, many trials of products liability cases boil
down to a battle of the experts, with the jury being given the job of resolving the
conflicting expert testimony.
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Federal Rules of Civil Procedure contained no separate provisions concern-
ing the discovery of the identity of experts or the opinions or facts held by
them," the case law reflected a belief that information held or compiled by
an expert should not be as freely discoverable as the information of other
persons. Absent specific guidance from the Federal Rules, courts arrived
at divergent solutions when confronted with the problem of how much, if
any, discovery could be obtained from an expert retained by an opposing
party.'
The limitations upon discovery of expert information created by the
courts were grounded upon three concepts: (1) communications of experts
are protected from disclosure by the attorney-client privilege; (2) the work
product doctrine of Hickman v. Taylor7 applies to the information of ex-
perts retained by a party "in anticipation of litigation"; and (3) that it is
unfair for the inquiring party to acquire information from an expert hired
by the opposing party.'
Very few courts embraced the "privilege" theory. Moreover, the decision
in Hickman that mere memoranda prepared by an attorney are not privi-
leged created the inevitable conclusion that findings of an expert retained
by a party should not fall within the purview of the attorney-client privi-
lege However, the work product doctrine established in Hickman was
deemed by many courts to impede the discovery of expert information.'"
Treating as work product the findings of an expert retained by a party
was severely criticized. Courts felt that the observations and findings of the
5. The only provision concerning experts was rule 35 requiring a liberal exchange of infor-
mation held by medical experts when the mental or physical condition of a party was in
controversy.
6. See generally Maginnis v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 207 F. Supp. 739 (E.D. La. 1962),
and cases cited therein; Annot., 86 A.L.R.2d 138 (1962).
For an often-cited example of the judicial divergence on the issue of expert discovery, see
Cold Metal Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 684 (D. Mass. 1947) and Sachs
v. Aluminum Co. of America, 167 F.2d 570 (6th Cir. 1948), aff'g per curiam, Cold Metal
Process Co. v. Aluminum Co. of America, 7 F.R.D. 425 (N.D. Ohio 1947). The Massachusetts
and Ohio courts had before them the issue of the discoverability of experts retained in
anticipation of litigation by the plaintiff. The Ohio court held discovery was permissible; the
Massachusetts court ruled discovery of such experts was improper.
7. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
8. Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of An Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14 STAN. L.
REv. 455 (1962) [hereinafter cited as Friedenthal]; Note, Discovery of Experts: A Historical
Problem and A Proposed FRCP Solution, 53 MINN. L. REv. 785 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
53 MINN. L. REV.].
9. Friedenthal, supra note 8, at 455-69; 53 MINN. L. REv., supra note 8, at 794. See also
Maginnis v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 207 F. Supp. 739, 743 (E.D. La. 1962).
10. Friedenthal, supra note 8, at 472.
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expert are distinct and dissimilar from the legal analysis and mental im-
pressions of an attorney which the work product doctrine seeks to shelter
from disclosure:
[T]here seems little justification for extending work product to cover
expert information. The opinions and conclusions of an expert are not those
which Hickman sought to protect. Unlike the attorney's impressions or those
of the client or his investigators as to the value of certain evidence or the
veracity of a potential witness, the opinions and conclusions of an expert
constitute evidence in themselves, and may be the only way in which to
establish facts material to the case. Indeed, the report of an expert to the
attorney is sought for the very purpose of obtaining such facts and it can
hardly be said that once in the hands of the attorney the information becomes
"protected conclusions" any more than does an eyewitness account by any
other witness. The demoralizing aspects of discovery foreseen in the Hickman
case are certainly not present when a deposition is taken, since the only
danger is that the expert might trip himself should he change his testimony
at the trial. It is apparent that in this respect the expert is no different from
any other witness who has information relevant to the case."
The "unfairness" discovery limitation was predicated upon the belief
that one who engages the services of an expert is purchasing the property
of that expert, and to permit liberal discovery of his information would
foster laziness and allow a party to prepare his case at the expense of his
opponent. 12 This objection represents the crux of the resistance to open
discovery of the expert. In a legal environment that regards the procure-
ment and development of expert assistance as a trait of the successful trial
lawyer, it seems inconsistent to allow the opponent easy access to the
expert and his information.
According to the Federal Rules, the scope of discovery extends to any
unprivileged matter relevant to a pending action. 3 The purposes for allow-
ing such a broad scope of discovery 4 are as applicable to the facts and
opinions of experts as they are to lay witnesses and other permitted objects
of discovery. 5
11. Id. at 472-73. Accord, United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968); United
States v. McKay, 372 F.2d 174 (5th Cir. 1967). See also Scourtes v. Fred W. Albrecht Grocery
Co., 15 F.R.D. 55 (N.D. Ohio 1953).
12. Friedenthal, supra note 8, at 479-88.
13. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(1).
14. See note 2 and accompanying text supra.
15. If the principal value to be served by liberal discovery practice is the promotion
of justice by the elimination of surprise, then such a practice would seem to be espe-
cially necessary in the case of expert witnesses. Discovery makes it possible to explore
effectively on cross-examination the basis of an expert's opinion, thus providing a
[Vol. 10:706
COMMENTS
This conflict between the liberal discovery policy of the Federal Rules
and judicially-imposed restrictions on the discovery of experts was finally
resolved by the Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure,
which became effective July 1, 1970.16 Rule 26(b)(4)"7 does not completely
remove the restraints imposed on the discovery of the opinions and facts
held by experts retained in anticipation of litigation but establishes a
compromise solution. 8 In drafting rule 26(b) (4), the restriction of discovery
based upon privilege was repudiated, and classification of the expert's
necessary check on the witness. Given the high regard in which expert testimony is
frequently held by lay triers of the fact, such a check would seem to be essential if the
outcome of the case is to reflect the merits. Furthermore, the application of liberal
discovery practice to experts would help in the formulation of issues in exactly the
same way as it would with respect to lay witnesses. And, to the extent that an effect
on settlement and length of trial is observed as a result of the discovery of lay witnesses,
a similar effect should be observed in the case of experts. Kalinowski, supra note 2, at
46.
Cf. United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593 (D. Md. 1963); Leding v. United
States Rubber Co., 23 F.R.D. 220 (D. Mont. 1959).
16. 398 U.S. 977 (1970).
17. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) provides:
(4) Trial Preparation: Experts. Discovery of facts known and opinions held by
experts, otherwise discoverable under the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this rule
and acquired or developed in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be obtained
only as follows:
(A) (i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each
person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at trial, to state the
subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to state the substance
of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary of
the grounds for each opinion. (ii) Upon motion, the court may order further discovery
by other means, subject to such restrictions as to scope and such provisions, pursuant
to subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this rule, concerning fees and expenses as the court may
deem appropriate.
(B) A party may discover facts known or opinions held by an expert who has been
retained or specially employed by another party in anticipation of litigation or prepara-
tion for trial and who is not expected to be called as a witness at trial, only as provided
in Rule 35(b) or upon a showing of exceptional circumstances under which it is imprac-
ticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain facts or opinions on the same subject
by other means.
(C) Unless manifest injustice would result, (i) the court shall require that the party
seeking discovery pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in responding to
discovery under subdivisions (b)(4)(A)(ii) and (b)(4)(B) of this rule; and (ii) with
respect to discovery obtained under subdivision (b)(4) (A) (ii) of this rule the court may
require, and with respect to discovery obtained under subdivision (b)(4)(B) of this rule
the court shall require, the party seeking discovery to pay the other party a fair portion
of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred by the latter party in obtaining facts and
opinions from the expert.
18. See 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 2029.
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information on work product was deemed "ill-considered."' However, the
draftsmen did incorporate the "unfairness" doctrine into 26(b)(4).11 The
result is a rule creating a uniform approach to the problem by attempting
to balance the need for access to the information of an opposing party's
expert against the prejudicial effects of such inquiries.
THE APPLICATION OF RULE 26(b)(4) TO THE EXPERT
Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts under rule
26(b)(4) is not the "free" discovery which was allowed by some courts prior
to 1970.21 Although the rule does recognize that discovery is imperative in
certain situations, it limits discovery to prevent a party from building his
own case with the opinions of experts retained by others. 2 To determine
whether and how much discovery will be allowed of a particular expert, one
must first ascertain whether rule 26(b)(4) applies to that expert.
Professors Wright and Miller have established four classes into which an
expert may fall:
(1) Experts retained or specially employed in anticipation of litigation who
a party expects to use as a witness at trial.
(2) Experts retained or specially employed in anticipation of litigation or
preparation for trial but not expected to testify at trial.
(3) Experts informally consulted in preparation for trial but not retained.
(4) Experts whose information was not acquired in preparation for trial."
Classes (1) and (2) embody the experts who were the subject of controversy
prior to 1970-those retained by a party to assist in the preparation and
trial. Rule 26(b)(4) expressly provides guidelines for discovery of the facts
known and opinions held by experts "acquired or developed in anticipation
of litigation or for trial. '24 "Anticipation of litigation" is not simply the
consultation of-an expert after suit has been filed. The problem of demar-
cation arises in determining whether a party was merely acting in the
ordinary course of business when he instructed an expert to examine and
report on a certain subject, or whether the instruction was given in contem-
plation of specific potential litigation. The issue becomes particularly
19. Advisory Committee's Note, Proposed Amendments to the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure Relating To Discovery, 48 F.R.D. 487, 504-05 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Advisory
Committee's Note].
20. Id. at 505.
21. United States v. John R.-Piquette Corp., 52 F.R.D. 370 (E.D. Mich. 1971), discussing
United States v. Meyer, 398 F.2d 66 (9th Cir. 1968).
22. In re Brown Co., 54 F.R.D. 384 (E.D. La. 1972).
23. 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 2029, at 250.
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4).
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acute when the party involved is an insurance company or similar entity
whose business is of a nature that the possibility of litigation is present.
In Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba,5 it was alleged
that the defendant ocean carriers had damaged a shipment of the plain-
tiff's electronic organs. The plaintiff's insurer hired a marine surveyor who
examined the goods shortly after the damage was sustained and submitted
certain written reports to the insurer. Utilizing its right of subrogation, the
insurer filed suit in the plaintiffs name more than fifteen months after the
first report of the surveyor.26 The plaintiff refused a request for the produc-
tion of the surveyor's reports, contending that he was an expert whose
reports were prepared in anticipation of litigation since a claim had arisen
and litigation was a contingency at the time of the inspection of the sur-
veyor.2 1 Such a broad application of "anticipation of litigation" was re-
jected by the court on two grounds: at the time of preparation of the reports
by the expert, the insurer had yet to consult counsel; 2 and the time lag
between the observations and reports of the expert and the subsequent
filing of suit.29 The court was strongly influenced by the fact that, if the
plaintiffs contentions were accepted, it would effectively immunize insur-
ance companies and similar parties from discovery."
An expert's information is not protected by rule 26(b)(4) unless it was
compiled in response to or in furtherance of a specific suit. Thus data
prepared or obtained merely in the possibility of impending litigation is
not within the scope of the rule.3' If the information of an expert retained
25. 54 F.R.D. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1972), discussed in McDougall v. Dunn, 468 F.2d 468 (4th Cir.
1972).
26. Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367, 371-72 (N.D. Ill.
1972).
27. Id. at 370.
28. Id. at 373. Spaulding v. Denton, 68 F.R.D. 342 (D. Del. 1975), rejected this rationale,
noting that the 1970 amendments had expanded the scope of protection accorded work prod-
uct under the rules to include non-lawyers. Id. at 344-45. However, Spaulding did concur with
the definition of "anticipation of litigation" given in Thomas Organ.
29. Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367, 373-74 (N.D. Ill.
1972).
30. "If every time a party prepared a document in the ordinary course of business to guide
claim handling, this document was deemed to be prepared in anticipation of litigation, it is
difficult to see what would be discoverable." Id. at 374.
31. See Spaulding v. Denton, 68 F.R.D. 342 (D. Del. 1975); cf. Miles v. Bell Helicopter Co.,
385 F. Supp. 1029 (N.D. Ga. 1974). This decision interpreted "anticipation of litigation" only
in regard to the work product rule of rule 26(b)(3). However, there is no reason to believe that
"anticipation of litigation" should be defined differently under rule 26(b)(4). In Thomas
Organ Co. v. Jadranska Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1972), the court did not
draw any distinction between the meaning of "anticipation of litigation" when compelling
the production of certain documents and when rejecting a claim of protection from discovery
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by a party is compiled in the ordinary course of the party's business, it is
freely discoverable even though the investigation was precipitated by the
frequency of litigation involving such subject matter.32
Expert information, which is neither acquired nor developed in anticipa-
tion of litigation, falls within the fourth class of experts-those who did not
acquire their information in preparation for trial, but who were actors or
viewers with respect to transactions or occurrences relevant to the lawsuit.
Experts in this class are not protected by the provisions of 26(b) (4) but are
discoverable as ordinary witnesses. 3 Included in this category are experts
who are parties to the suit 4 or general employees of a party.
3 5
If an expert has been informally consulted by a party or his counsel and
has not been retained, he is not subject to discovery.36 But if the facts and
opinions of an expert are developed subsequent to his being retained and
in anticipation of litigation, discovery of the expert is governed by rule
26(b)(4). The quantum of discovery permissible under 26(b)(4) is depen-
dent upon whether the party intends to use the expert as a witness at trial.
Part (A) of the rule governs discovery of the expert expected to be called
as a witness and part (B) controls discovery of the expert retained by the
party but who is not expected to testify.
RULE 26(b)(4)(A): THE EXPERT EXPECTED TO BE CALLED AS A WITNESS
Prior to the 1970 amendments, a primary complaint concerning the re-
fusal to allow discovery of experts was that it was exceedingly difficult to
cross-examine effectively an opponent's expert witness without the
advance preparation afforded by discovery.37 Part (A) of 26(b)(4) provides
based on both 26(b)(3) and (b)(4). See also notes 70-85 and accompanying text infra (discuss-
ing the relationship of rule 26(b)(3) and the discovery of expert information).
32. Cf. Miles v. Bell Helicopter Co., 385 F. Supp. 1029 (N.D. Ga. 1974). But see Almaguer
v. Chicago, R.I. & Pac. R.R., 55 F.R.D. 147 (D. Neb. 1972).
33. Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 19, at 503. See, e.g., In re Brown Co., 54 F.R.D.
384 (E.D. La. 1972); Duke Gardens Foundation, Inc. v. Universal Restoration, Inc., 52 F.R.D.
365 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
34. Rodrigues v. Hrinda, 56 F.R.D. 11 (W.D. Pa. 1972); Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Shields, 17 F.R.D. 277 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
35. Russo v. Merck & Co., 21 F.R.D. 237 (D.R.I. 1957); Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines
Steel Co., 6 F.R.D. 594 (W.D. Pa. 1947). If the relevant information of the general employee-
expert was obtained only when he was specially assigned to the subject matter of the suit in
anticipation of litigation, the information is protected by the discovery limitations of 26(b)(4).
See Breedlove v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 57 F.R.D. 202 (N.D. Miss. 1972). For further discuss-
sion, see note 66 and accompanying text infra.
36. Nemetz v. Aye, 63 F.R.D. 66 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Advisory Committee's Note, supra note
19, at 504.
37. Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 19, at 503. "A California study of discovery
[Vol. 10:706
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relief by requiring a party to answer interrogatories concerning the facts
and opinions on which the expert will testify and empowering the court to
grant additional discovery if necessary.
When interrogatories are served upon a party pursuant to 26(b)(4)(A),
a good faith judgment as to whether a retained expert will in fact be called
to testify is required. Any doubts should be resolved in favor of disclosure.I
Discovery under 26(b)(4) should be limited until after the parties have
determined who will be their expert witnesses.3 9 At what time a party
should know whether he expects to call the expert, is left unanswered by
the rule and is determined by the court. 0 The courts are vested with
sufficient discretionary authority to prevent abusive or prejudicial actions
during pre-trial discovery and to insure that discovery responses are timely
and adequate. After a party has answered 26(b) (4) interrogatories concern-
ing the identity and opinions of the experts he expects to call, the party
has a continuing duty to supplement seasonably his response with informa-
tion on any additional expert testimony he decides to use at trial."'
As two recent decisions illustrate, a failure to respond adequately to
interrogatories and supplement the responses can result in the court im-
posing sanctions on the recalcitrant party. In a products liability action,
Weiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp.," Chrylser had not revealed to the plaintiff
any opinions of its expert concerning the possibility that the failure of an
auto part was due to damage occurring during the accident and not caused
by a manufacturing defect. The Second Circuit held that, by permitting
and pretrial in condemnation cases notes that the only substitute for discovery of experts'
valuation materials is 'lengthy-and often fruitless-cross-examination during trial,' and
recommends pretrial exchange of such material." Id., citing CALIF. LAW REV. COMM'N,
DISCOVERY IN EMINENT DOMAIN PROCEEDINGS 707-10 (Jan. 1963).
38. Blair, A Guide to the New Federal Discovery Practice, 21 DRAKE L. REV. 58, 64 (1971).
39. Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 19, at 504. This limitation is intended to
prevent a party from using his opponent's experts to prepare his own case. Kozar v. Chesa-
peake and 0. Ry., 320 F. Supp. 335 (W.D. Mich. 1970), afl'd in part, vacated and remanded
in part on other grounds, 449 F.2d 1238 (6th Cir. 1971) (discovery denied after the inquiring
party admitted it did not intend to hire a mechanical engineer until after receiving the
conclusions of the opponent's mechanical engineering experts).
40. One commentator, criticizing the lack of guidelines on the timing aspect of discovery
under rule 26(b)(4)(A), stated: "Without further specificity the danger exists that the liti-
gants will either prepare their case too early, making it possible for their opponent to exploit
the preparation, or, more probably, delay naming their expert witnesses, rendering it difficult
for their opponents to use the available discovery procedures." 53 MINN. L. REv., supra note
8, at 802-03. See also Long, supra note 2, at 127.
41. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(B); 4 J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE 26.66 [3] (1975). The duty
to supplement responses is a continuing duty and does not end with the beginning of trial.
Weiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 515 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1975).
42. 515 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1975).
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Chrysler to put on expert evidence concerning this theory and by not
allowing the plaintiff to put on evidence in rebuttal, the trial court erred
and the judgment entered on a jury verdict for the defendant was
reversed.1
3
Similarly, a plaintiff who had not informed the defendant of an expert
hired after the answering of interrogatories was precluded from calling the
expert as a witness in Tabatchnik v. G. D. Searle & Co.44 In discussing the
duty to supplement seasonably responses to discovery, the court stated:
In the absence of unexpected developments, supplementation after the
jury has been drawn cannot be considered to have been made "seasonably."
The subjective explanation for the default is irrelevant. It makes no differ-
ence whether it was due to a failure to prepare for trial or to an intentional
purpose to gain the benefit of surprise. The rule bars the result without regard
to cause, except for those beyond control. 5
The requirement that a party answer interrogatories by identifying each
expert expected to be called as a witness at trial and by stating the sub-
stance of the facts and opinions upon which each will testify is contained
in section (i) of 26(b)(4)(A)10 Compliance with this form of discovery is
mandatory upon the parties. Whether further discovery, such as produc-
tion of documents or taking of depositions, will be permitted under section
(ii) of 26(b)(4)(A), is a matter within the court's discretion. Before moving
for further discovery under section (ii), the inquiring party should first
exhaust discovery through interrogatories available under section (i).17
43. The court stated it made no difference that the plaintiff may have been aware such
testimony would be presented because of similar arguments in state court litigation. The issue
as to the propriety of the failure to provide the information is not merely whether the plaintiff
has been surprised by the testimony. Id. at 456. An interrogatory response is insufficient even
though the information sought is "within the knowledge of the interrogating party." Id.,
quoting Bowles v. Safeway Stores, Inc., 4 F.R.D. 469, 470-71 (W.D. Mo. 1945). Emphasizing
the issue formulation purposes of discovery, the court declared:
Consequently, to characterize the issue here as being determined by a lack of "sur-
prise" distorts the essential problem. The policy which prompted amendment to Rule
26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure to allow more liberal discovery of
potential expert testimony was not merely for convenience of the court and the parties,
but was intended to make the task of the trier of fact more manageable by means of
an orderly presentation of complex issues of fact. Id. at 456-57.
44. 67 F.R.D. 49 (D.N.J. 1975).
45. Id. at 55.
46. For examples of what courts consider to be adequate responses to 26(b)(4)(i) interroga-
tories, see Olmert v. Nelson, 60 F.R.D. 369 (D.D.C. 1973); Rupp v. Vock & Wiederhold, Inc.,
52 F.R.D. 111 (N.D. Ohio 1971).
47. United States v. John R.-Piquette Corp., 52 F.R.D. 370 (E.D. Mich. 1971); Wilson v.
Resnick, 51 F.R.D. 510 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
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No guidelines are set forth as to when further discovery should be al-
lowed by the court. If such discovery is granted, the court must require the
inquiring party to pay the expert a reasonable fee for time spent in re-
sponding and may require the inquiring party to pay the other party a fair
portion of the fees and expenses reasonably incurred in procuring the
expert's information." The payment provisions of 26(b)(4) are intended to
alleviate the unfair result of a party using expert information which was
procured and developed at the expense of the opposing party.49
According to the Advisory Committee, "a party cannot obtain discovery
simply by offering to pay fees and expenses."5 The "unfairness" element
inherent in allowing discovery of an opponent's expert is not totally ne-
gated"1 by the payment provisions of 26(b)(4)(C), and even when such
payment is proffered, a court may decide further discovery under (A)(ii)
should not be allowed. Discovery should provide full disclosure of an ex-
pert's opinion and the facts and reasons upon which it was based, but
should not permit the inquiring party to develop impeachment material
or to obtain the expert's opinion based upon a different set of facts."
Divergent results have been reached regarding what circumstances man-
date the granting of further discovery. Despite the Advisory Committee's
statement to the contrary,53 one court has held that a party should be
allowed to depose experts freely as long as there is an appropriate payment
of costs and fees. 4 Other courts have refused requests for further discov-
ery.55
Before granting further discovery under (A) (ii), there should be some
showing of need which has not been satisfied by the interrogatory responses
under (A) (i). The court should weigh this need against the possibility of a
48. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4)(C).
49. Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 19, at 505.
50. Id.
51. See note 12 and accompanying text supra.
52. Knighton v. Villian & Fassio, 39 F.R.D. 11 (D. Md. 1965).
53. See note 50 and accompanying text supra.
54. Herbst v. ITT, 65 F.R.D. 528 (D. Conn. 1975). The Herbst court adopted the liberal
discovery concept of United States v. John R.-Piquette Corp., 52 F.R.D. 370 (E.D. Mich.
1971), which stated: "ET]he mutual and simultaneous exchange of the factual information
and opinions of the parties' respective experts . . . will best facilitate a clarification of the
issues and prepare all counsel for orderly and expeditious presentation at trial." Id. at 373.
55. Breedlove v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 57 F.R.D. 202 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Wilson v. Resnick,
51 F.R.D. 510 (E.D. Pa. 1970). In both cases, the parties were seeking production of docu-
ments prepared by the experts and were not seeking merely to take depositions. The result
was possibly influenced by the application of rule 26(b)(3). See notes 70-85 infra and accom-
panying text.
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party preparing his case with information obtained from the expert re-
tained by his opponent." However, further discovery under (A) (ii) should
not be precluded if potential abuses can be prevented by the issuance of a
protective order limiting the scope or establishing the conditions of such
discovery.57 In ruling on a motion for further discovery, it is preferable to
resolve any judicial doubts in favor of allowing some form of additional
discovery to permit the parties to procure a mutual knowledge of all the
relevant facts prior to trial. 8
RULE 26(b)(4)(B): THE EXPERT NOT EXPECTED TO BE CALLED AS A WITNESS
Once a party has decided not to call as a witness an expert retained in
anticipation of litigation, the need for discovery to prepare an effective
cross-examination vanishes. In contrast, the policy reasons for restricting
discovery grow stronger in such a situation. The fear that an opponent will
have access to any adverse information developed by an expert who will
not be used at trial should be alleviated. Accordingly, rule 26(b)(4)(B)
severely curtails discovery of non-witness experts by providing that the
facts or opinions held by them may be obtained by an opponent only in
56. The ruling of a court may depend upon what type of discovery is requested. A court
may allow a party to depose an expert but refuse to compel production of a report prepared
by that expert. See notes 54 and 55 and accompanying text supra. See also 8 WRIGHT &
MILLER, supra note 3, § 2025, at 215-16 (production of documents prepared in anticipation of
litigation is denied when the inquiring party can obtain the same information by taking a
deposition).
57. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c).
58. Professor Friedenthal states:
The obvious objection to permitting unlimited discovery for cross-examination is
that it is impossible to divorce information for purposes of impeachment from informa-
tion to be used in direct support of the discoverer's own case. A court may control the
actual introduction of evidence at trial, but it cannot prevent the use of informa-
tion, ostensibly obtained for cross-examination only, to provide new approaches or to
collect data which can be utilized by the discover's experts but which information
was obtained only after considerable calculation and expense to the adverse party.
A decision must be made, then, whether the needs of cross-examination outweigh
the unfairness which could result. As already pointed out, the benefits to cross-
examination in cases involving expert witnesses are substantial, whereas the unfair-
ness, if it does exist in a particular case in terms of time, effort, and money, is often
no worse in the case where an attorney seeks information from an adverse party's
expert than it is where he seeks it from an eye-witness found by the adverse party after
long and costly search. The utlimate requirement that judicial decisions be based on
the true facts overcomes any detriment which might be suffered by the adversary
system. Friedenthal, supra note 8, at 487.
Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 19, at 504 cites the section of the Friedenthal article
containing this passage as a "full analysis of the problem and strong recommendations to the
same effect [as those adopted in 26(b)(4)(A)]."
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certain exceptional situations. The terms of 26(b)(4)(B) are unclear as to
whether even the identity of such an expert is freely discoverable. Two
courts which have considered the matter have reached opposite results.
5 9
Before a party can obtain facts known and opinions held by the non-
witness expert, he must show that there are "exceptional circumstances
under which it is impracticable for the party seeking discovery to obtain
facts or opinions on the same subject by other means."8 0 Such exceptional
circumstances arise when the only known expert available on a particular
subject has been retained by the opposing party, 1 or when the other party's
expert has made an examination or inspection which, due to a change of
conditions, can no longer be made by another expert."2
Discoverability under 26(b) (4) (B) appears to turn on whether one party
possesses information which the opposing party cannot obtain through the
exercise of ordinary diligence. When a court does allow discovery after
finding the presence of exceptional circumstances, it is mandatory that the
court require the inquiring party to pay both a reasonable fee to the expert
for time spent responding to discovery and a fair portion of the fees and
expenses the other party incurred in obtaining the expert's facts and opin-
ions.6"
59. In support of allowing discovery of the identity of such experts, see Sea Colony, Inc. v.
Continental Ins. Co., 63 F.R.D. 113 (D. Del. 1974); 8 WRIGHT & MILLER, supra note 3, § 2032.
Contra, Perry v. W. S. Darley & Co., 54 F.R.D. 278 (E.D. Wis. 1971).
Discovery of the identity of the non-witness expert should be allowed to alert a party to
the possible existence of information to which he may be entitled after making the necessary
showing of exceptional circumstances. "This type of information is usually the first step in
discovering the existence of reports of experts consulted. Should counsel thereafter attempt
to ascertain the contents of such reports, a full-dress showing of exceptional circumstances
would be a condition precedent to discovery." Sea Colony, Inc. v. Continental Ins. Co., supra,
at 114.
60. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4)(B).
61. Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1972). The inability to obtain the
specific opinion of an expert engaged by an opposing party is not a sufficient showing of
exceptional circumstances when opinions on other experts on the same subject may be pro-
cured. See Crockett v. Virginia Folding Box Co., 61 F.R.D. 312 (E.D. Va. 1974). Under the
facts of this case, a strong argument could be raised that the expert was actually an actor or
viewer with regard to occurances alleged relevant to the litigation and not an expert retained
in anticipation of litigation protected from discovery under 26(b)(4)(B). The plaintiff con-
ceded that the expert was retained in anticipation of litigation. Id. at 320. For a discussion
of this case, see notes 78-83 and accompanying text infra.
62. See, e.g., Sanford Const. Co. v. Kaiser Alum. & Chem. Sales, Inc., 45 F.R.D. 465 (E.D.
Ky. 1968); Walsh v. Reynolds Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1954); Colden v. R. J.
Schofield Motors, 14 F.R.D. 521 (N.D. Ohio 1952).
63. FED. R. CIv. P. 26(b)(4)(C).
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THE EXPERT WHO PLAYS Two ROLES
While the involvement of an expert in a particular case can fall into any
of four distinct categories,64 the quantum of permissible discovery varying
with each, frequently the same expert falls into more than one category.
An expert might be retained by a party to analyze and render information
on more than one aspect of the case and, as the trial approaches, the party
may decide to have the expert testify on only one of the subjects upon
which he has formed an opinion. Under such circumstances, with the ex-
pert in effect wearing two hats, is discovery controlled by 26(b)(4)(A) or
(4)(B)? Similarly, an expert may be an observer of certain events relevant
to the litigation, thus not protected by 26(b) (4), and may also be an expert
retained in anticipation of litigation.
Prior to 1970, when confronted with an expert who held both information
subject to discovery and also information not subject to discovery, the
courts did not hesitate to enter orders allowing discovery but with the
scope limited. 5 Although rule 26(b)(4) does not expressly address the issue,
the courts have continued to dissect the information of an expert, thus
limiting discovery in a manner consistent with the policy of 26(b)(4).11
In Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co. v. Lumbermens Mutual Cas-
ualty Co.,7 the acdbunting firm of Price Waterhouse had been both the
general auditor for the plaintiff corporation and had prepared two reports
concerning a claim against the defendant insurance company. The plain-
tiff intended to call Price Waterhouse as a witness only in regard to one of
64. See notes 23-36 and accompanying text supra.
65. See Lee v. Crown Cent. Pet. Corp., 33 F.R.D. 11 (S.D. Tex. 1963); Walsh v. Reynolds
Metals Co., 15 F.R.D. 376 (D.N.J. 1954); Floe v. Plowden, 10 F.R.D. 504 (E.D.S.C. 1950);
Moran v. Pittsburgh-Des Moines Steel Co., 6 F.R.D. 594 (W.D. Pa. 1947).
66. Inspiration Consol. Copper Co. v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 60 F.R.D. 205 (S.D.N.Y.
1973); Bailey v. Meister Brau, Inc., 57 F.R.D. 11 (N.D. Ill. 1972); In re Brown Co., 54 F.R.D.
384 (E.D. La. 1972).
Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Sun Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 68 F.R.D. 397 (E.D. Va.
1975), apparently rejected such an approach. The court held that a general employee expert
who acquired information only when specially assigned to the case in anticipation of litigation
was not entitled to protection from discovery under 26(b)(4). This decision is contrary to the
rule's emphasis on whether the information sought was acquired as a result of pending
litigation and not on the status of the expert prior to acquiring the information.
Seiffer v. Topsy's Int'l, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 69 (D. Kan. 1975), presents a more logical analysis
of the same problem. A general employee of the defendant accounting firm was requested by
counsel to review certain working papers and audit reports. This was the employee's first
involvement with the subject matter of the suit. The court held that the employee was an
expert "specially employed" in anticipation of litigation; therefore rule 26(b)(4) controlled
the discovery of his reports.
67. 60 F.R.D. 205 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
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the reports prepared by it. As general auditor, Price Waterhouse was not
an expert retained in anticipation of litigation and therefore was discovera-
ble as an ordinary witness." However, the court viewed Price Waterhouse
as an expert protected by 26(b)(4) with regard to the reports prepared in
anticipation of litigation and would not allow production of reports on
which Price Waterhouse would not be called as a witness at trial."
As Inspiration Consolidated Copper Co. demonstrates, the allowable
discovery of an expert is dependent upon the nature of his contact with the
litigation and its subject matter. It is possible for the same individual to
have a multiplicity of distinct and divergent contacts requiring the parties
to specify what information is being sought from the expert and what the
involvement of the expert with the litigation or its subject matter was at
the time he acquired such information. Only then is a court able to ascer-
tain the scope of discovery allowable.
THE WORK PRODUCT RULE OF 26(b)(3) AND THE EXPERT
The applicability of the work product doctrine of Hickman v. Taylor"
to the expert was a source of controversy for many years, but by the 1960's
the courts began rejecting the work product rule as imposing a limitation
on the discovery of expert information." In 26(b)(4), the draftsmen seem-
ingly laid to rest the matter by disavowing the work product doctrine as a
rationale for protecting expert information from discovery.7 2
The 1970 amendments" codified the work product doctrine by adopting
rule 26(b) (3).4 This rule resolved the conflict as to whether the work prod-
uct doctrine covered only the preparatory work of attorneys. A special
68. Id. at 210.
69. Id.
70. 329. U.S. 495, 511 (1947).
71. See notes 10 and 11 and accompanying text supra.
72. Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 19, at 505.
73. 398 U.S. 977 (1970).
74. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3) provides in part:
(3) Trial Preparation: Materials. Subject to the provisions of subdivision (b)(4)
of this rule, a party may obtain discovery of documents and tangible things otherwise
discoverable under subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and prepared in anticipation of
litigation or for trial by or for another party or by or for that other party's representa-
tive (including his attorney, consultant, surety, indemnitor, insurer, or agent) only
upon a showing that the party seeking discovery has substantial need of the materials
in the preparation of his case and that he is unable without undue hardship to obtain
the substantial equivalent of the materials by other means. In ordering discovery of
such materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect
against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories
of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the litigation.
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showing of need is now required before allowing the production of materials
prepared in anticipation of litigation by or for a party (or any representa-
tive acting on his behalf) as well as those materials prepared by an attor-
ney.75
Limiting access to expert information under the Hickman doctrine was
an outgrowth of the broader dispute of whether the work product rule was
applicable to materials prepared by non-lawyer agents or representatives
of parties.76 The 1970 amendments appeared to accept the case law provid-
ing work product protection to the non-lawyer agent or representative, but
did not extend the rule's scope to embrace the expert. Rule 26(b)(3) sup-
ports such a contention by stating that it is "[slubject to the provisions
of 26(b) (4)."7 In applying the amended rules to the discovery of an expert's
report, it would be possible to construe 26(b)(4) as controlling and making
26(b)(3) irrelevant.
Courts have thus far not interpreted the amended rules in the above
manner. Instead, they have subjected requests for production of docu-
ments prepared by experts to the provisions of both 26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4). 78
Under this view, an inquiring party would not only have to satisfy the
requisite requirements of 26(b)(4)(A) or (4)(B) before discovering an ex-
pert's report, but would also have to show a pressing need for the materials
and an inability to obtain the substantial equivalent by other means. 79
The conflict between the rejection of the work product rationale as a
basis for limiting discovery of the expert and the application of rule
26(b)(3) to the report of an expert is not irreconcilable. As noted earlier,
the information held by an expert is viewed as essentially evidentiary in
nature and not akin to the legal theory and strategy of the attorney's work
product. However, if the expert does undertake a consulting role in prepar-
ing for litigation, a court may quite logically view the expert as being in
the class of non-lawyer agents protected from discovery by 26(b) (3). In any
75. Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 19, at 501-02. See also 8 U. RPcH. L. REV. 340
(1974).
76. Alltmont v. United States, 177 F.2d 971 (3d Cir. 1950), held that the work product
doctrine applied to non-lawyer investigators. Alltmont was the basis for decisions holding
that experts retained in anticipation of litigation were protected from discovery by the work
product doctrine. See, e.g., Vaughn v. Chrysler Corp., 46 F.R.D. 6 (W.D. Okla. 1969);
Carpenter-Trant Drilling Co. v. Magnolia Petroleum Corp., 23 F.R.D. 257 (D. Neb. 1959).
77. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
78. Crockett v. Virginia Folding Box Co., 61 F.R.D. 312 (E.D. Va. 1974); Breedlove v.
Beech Aircraft Corp., 57 F.R.D. 202 (N.D. Miss. 1972); Thomas Organ Co. v. Jadranska
Slobodna Plovidba, 54 F.R.D. 367 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Wilson v. Resnick, 51 F.R.D. 510 (E.D.
Pa. 1970).
79. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
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event, it should be pointed out that 26(b)(3) only limits discovery of the
expert's report and has no effect if the party is merely attempting to depose
the expert.
Although the discovery requirements of 26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4) overlap,
the application of both rules to the discovery of an expert's report can
increase the required showing of the requesting party. In Crockett v. Vir-
ginia Folding Box Co.,"0 the plaintiff was denied access to documents pre-
pared by an expert of the defendant in anticipation of litigation. The court
acknowledged that the plaintiff had met the requirement of 26(b) (4) (B) by
establishing that such information could not be obtained through the use
of independent experts.8 ' The court then considered the substantial need
showing required for discovery under 26(b)(3)."s Balancing the materiality
of any evidence contained in the reports of the expert against the danger
of disclosing information prepared in anticipation of litigation, the court
concluded that the plaintiff had failed to establish a substantial need for
the materials."
Both 26(b)(3) and 26(b)(4)(B) require a party seeking discovery to
demonstrate an inability to procure the same information by other means.
As Crockett illustrates, rule 26(b)(3) also mandates that the court consider
the importance of the materials to the party seeking them.84 By subjecting
materials prepared by an expert in anticipation of litigation to 26(b)(3), a
different and more stringent discovery limitation is imposed than when a
party is merely seeking to depose the expert s5
80. 61 F.R.D. 312 (E.D. Va. 1974).
81. Id. at 320.
82. Rule 26(b)(4) is not explicit in setting forth the requirement that a 'substantial need'
be shown. However, it is clear that Rule 24(b)(4) [sic] was drafted as a further limitation
on materials and information otherwise discoverable under Rule 24(b)(3) [sic]. See introduc-
tory paragraph to Rule 24(b)(4) [sic]. Rule 24(b)(3) [sic] specifically provides for a demon-
stration of 'substantial need.' That requirement would therefore apply to Rule 24(b)(4) [sic]
by reference and implication. Id. at 320 n.17.
83. Id. at 320. The expert hired by the defendant was a psychologist whose task was to
review the employment testing program of the defendant with regard to the possibility that
the program was violative of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. The plaintiffs brought
a class action suit alleging certain discriminatory employment practices by the defendant.
They anticipated the defendant raising a "good faith" defense to certain allegations in the
suit and contended information prepared by the expert was the only available evidence on
the subjective state of mind of the defendant company officials. In rejecting the discovery
request, the court decided evidence of the subjective state of mind of company officials would
not be of substantial use in resolving the issue of good faith. Id. at 321.
84. Advisory Committee's Note, supra note 19, at 501.
85. Compare Breedlove v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 57 F.R.D. 202 (N.D. Miss. 1972) with
Herbst v. ITT, 65 F.R.D. 528 (D. Conn. 1975).
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CONCLUSION
In recent years, the bar has evinced an increasing acceptance of applying
liberal discovery practices to expert information developed in anticipation
of litigation. Often, counsel will bypass the rigors of rule 26(b)(4) and
exchange the reports of their experts or allow the opposing party to freely
depose the expert. Yet not infrequently, a party will resist discovery of his
expert, believing that such discovery would be prejudicial to his cause.
Prior to 1970, a court had to analyze and choose between diverse policy
considerations in ruling on the discoverability of expert information. The
1970 amendment to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure removed this
burden by providing a uniform method of approaching the discovery of
expert information. A court, provided with the guidance and policy of rule
26(b)(4), need only make a factual determination as to what, if any, provi-
sions apply to the expert information sought. Although minor questions
remain, parties are now able to prepare for trial with a reasonable certainty
as to the discoverability of an expert's information developed in anticipa-
tion of litigation.
T. W. W.
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